Frontier of Self and Impact Prediction

The construction of a coherent representation of our body and the mapping of the space immediately surrounding it are of the highest ecological importance. This space has at least three specificities: it is a space where actions are planned in order to interact with our environment; it is a space that contributes to the experience of self and self-boundaries, through tactile processing and multisensory interactions; last, it is a space that contributes to the experience of body integrity against external events. In the last decades, numerous studies have been interested in peripersonal space (PPS), defined as the space directly surrounding us and which we can interact with (for reviews, see Cléry et al., 2015b; de Vignemont and Iannetti, 2015; di Pellegrino and Làdavas, 2015). These studies have contributed to the understanding of how this space is constructed, encoded and modulated. The majority of these studies focused on subparts of PPS (the hand, the face or the trunk) and very few of them investigated the interaction between PPS subparts. In the present review, we summarize the latest advances in this research and we discuss the new perspectives that are set forth for futures investigations on this topic. We describe the most recent methods used to estimate PPS boundaries by the means of dynamic stimuli. We then highlight how impact prediction and approaching stimuli modulate this space by social, emotional and action-related components involving principally a parieto-frontal network. In a next step, we review evidence that there is not a unique representation of PPS but at least three sub-sections (hand, face and trunk PPS). Last, we discuss how these subspaces interact, and we question whether and how bodily self-consciousness (BSC) is functionally and behaviorally linked to PPS

I see what you mean

The ability to understand and predict others' behavior is essential for successful interactions. When making predictions about what other humans will do, we treat them as intentional systems and adopt the intentional stance, i.e., refer to their mental states such as desires and intentions. In the present experiments, we investigated whether the mere belief that the observed agent is an intentional system influences basic social attention mechanisms. We presented pictures of a human and a robot face in a gaze cuing paradigm and manipulated the likelihood of adopting the intentional stance by instruction: in some conditions, participants were told that they were observing a human or a robot, in others, that they were observing a human-like mannequin or a robot whose eyes were controlled by a human. In conditions in which participants were made to believe they were observing human behavior (intentional stance likely) gaze cuing effects were significantly larger as compared to conditions when adopting the intentional stance was less likely. This effect was independent of whether a human or a robot face was presented. Therefore, we conclude that adopting the intentional stance when observing others' behavior fundamentally influences basic mechanisms of social attention. The present results provide striking evidence that high-level cognitive processes, such as beliefs, modulate bottom-up mechanisms of attentional selection in a top-down manner

Proactive Inhibitory Control of Response as the Default State of Executive Control

Refraining from reacting does not only involve reactive inhibitory mechanisms. It was recently found that inhibitory control also relies strongly on proactive mechanisms. However, since most available studies have focused on reactive stopping, little is known about how proactive inhibition of response is implemented. Two behavioral experiments were conducted to identify the temporal dynamics of this executive function. They manipulated respectively the time during which inhibitory control must be sustained until a stimulus occurs, and the time limit allowed to set up inhibition before a stimulus occurs. The results show that inhibitory control is not set up after but before instruction, and is not transient and sporadic but sustained across time. Consistent with our previous neuroimaging findings, these results suggest that proactive inhibition of response is the default mode of executive control. This implies that top-down control of sensorimotor reactivity would consist of a temporary release (up to several seconds), when appropriate (when the environment becomes predictable), of the default locking state. This conclusion is discussed with regard to current anatomo-functional models of inhibitory control, and to methodological features of studies of attention and sensorimotor control

The dynamics of statistical learning in visual search and its interaction with salience processing: an EEG study

Visual attention can be guided by statistical regularities in the environment, that people implicitly learn from past experiences (statistical learning, SL). Moreover, a perceptually salient element can automatically capture attention, gaining processing priority through a bottom-up attentional control mechanism. The aim of our study was to investigate the dynamics of SL and if it shapes attentional target selection additively with salience processing, or whether these mechanisms interact, e.g. one gates the other. In a visual search task, we therefore manipulated target frequency (high vs. low) across locations while, in some trials, the target was salient in terms of colour. Additionally, halfway through the experiment, the high-frequency location changed to the opposite hemifield. EEG activity was simultaneously recorded, with a specific interest in two markers related to target selection and post-selection processing, respectively: N2pc and SPCN. Our results revealed that both SL and saliency significantly enhanced behavioural performance, but also interacted with each other, with an attenuated saliency effect at the high-frequency target location, and a smaller SL effect for salient targets. Concerning processing dynamics, the benefit of salience processing was more evident during the early stage of target selection and processing, as indexed by a larger N2pc and early-SPCN, whereas SL modulated the underlying neural activity particularly later on, as revealed by larger late-SPCN. Furthermore, we showed that SL was rapidly acquired and adjusted when the spatial imbalance changed. Overall, our findings suggest that SL is flexible to changes and, combined with salience processing, jointly contributes to establishing attentional priority

Separate and overlapping mechanisms of statistical regularities and salience processing in the occipital cortex and dorsal attention network

Attention selects behaviorally relevant inputs for in-depth processing. Beside the role of traditional signals related to goal-directed and stimulus-driven control, a debate exists regarding the mechanisms governing the effect of statistical regularities on attentional selection, and how these are integrated with other control signals. Using a visuo-spatial search task under fMRI, we tested the joint effects of statistical regularities and stimulus-driven salience. We found that both types of signals modulated occipital activity in a spatially specific manner. Salience acted primarily by reducing the attention bias towards the target location when associated with irrelevant distractors, while statistical regularities reduced this attention bias when the target was presented at a low probability location, particularly at the lower levels of the visual hierarchy. In addition, we found that both statistical regularities and salience activated the dorsal frontoparietal network. Additional exploratory analyses of functional connectivity revealed that only statistical regularities modulated the inter-regional coupling between the posterior parietal cortex and the occipital cortex. These results show that statistical regularities and salience signals are both spatially represented at the occipital level, but that their integration into attentional processing priorities relies on dissociable brain mechanisms

Integrated effects of top-down attention and statistical learning during visual search: an EEG study

The present study aims to investigate how the competition between visual elements is solved by top-down and/or statistical learning (SL) attentional control (AC) mechanisms when active together. We hypothesized that the "winner" element that will undergo further processing is selected either by one AC mechanism that prevails over the other, or by the joint activity of both mechanisms. To test these hypotheses, we conducted a visual search experiment that combined an endogenous cueing protocol (valid vs. neutral cue) and an imbalance of target frequency distribution across locations (high- vs. low-frequency location). The unique and combined effects of top-down control and SL mechanisms were measured on behaviour and amplitudes of three evoked-response potential (ERP) components (i.e., N2pc, P1, CNV) related to attentional processing. Our behavioural results showed better performance for validly cued targets and for targets in the high-frequency location. The two factors were found to interact, so that SL effects emerged only in the absence of top-down guidance. Whereas the CNV and P1 only displayed a main effect of cueing, for the N2pc we observed an interaction between cueing and SL, revealing a cueing effect for targets in the low-frequency condition, but not in the high-frequency condition. Thus, our data support the view that top-down control and SL work in a conjoint, integrated manner during target selection. In particular, SL mechanisms are reduced or even absent when a fully reliable top-down guidance of attention is at play

An evolutionary gap in primate default mode network organization

The human default mode network (DMN) is engaged at rest and in cognitive states such as self-directed thoughts. Interconnected homologous cortical areas in primates constitute a network considered as the equivalent. Here, based on a cross-species comparison of the DMN between humans and non-hominoid primates (macaques, marmosets, and mouse lemurs), we report major dissimilarities in connectivity profiles. Most importantly, the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) of non-hominoid primates is poorly engaged with the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), though strong correlated activity between the human PCC and the mPFC is a key feature of the human DMN. Instead, a fronto-temporal resting-state network involving the mPFC was detected consistently across non-hominoid primate species. These common functional features shared between non-hominoid primates but not with humans suggest a substantial gap in the organization of the primate\u27s DMN and its associated cognitive functions

What we observe is biased by what other people tell us: beliefs about the reliability of gaze behavior modulate attentional orienting to gaze cues

For effective social interactions with other people, information about the physical environment must be integrated with information about the interaction partner. In order to achieve this, processing of social information is guided by two components: a bottom-up mechanism reflexively triggered by stimulus-related information in the social scene and a top-down mechanism activated by task-related context information. In the present study, we investigated whether these components interact during attentional orienting to gaze direction. In particular, we examined whether the spatial specificity of gaze cueing is modulated by expectations about the reliability of gaze behavior. Expectations were either induced by instruction or could be derived from experience with displayed gaze behavior. Spatially specific cueing effects were observed with highly predictive gaze cues, but also when participants merely believed that actually non-predictive cues were highly predictive. Conversely, cueing effects for the whole gazed-at hemifield were observed with non-predictive gaze cues, and spatially specific cueing effects were attenuated when actually predictive gaze cues were believed to be non-predictive. This pattern indicates that (i) information about cue predictivity gained from sampling gaze behavior across social episodes can be incorporated in the attentional orienting to social cues, and that (ii) beliefs about gaze behavior modulate attentional orienting to gaze direction even when they contradict information available from social episodes

A New Approach for Assessment of Mental Architecture: Repeated Tagging

A new approach to the study of a relatively neglected property of mental architecture—whether and when the already-processed elements are separated from the to-be-processed elements—is proposed. The process of numerical proportion discrimination between two sets of elements defined either by color or by orientation can be described as sampling with or without replacement (characterized by binomial or hypergeometric probability distributions respectively) depending on the possibility to tag an element once or repeatedly. All empirical psychometric functions were approximated by a theoretical model showing that the ability to keep track of the already tagged elements is not an inflexible part of the mental architecture but rather an individually variable strategy which also depends on conspicuity of perceptual attributes. Strong evidence is provided that in a considerable number of trials, observers tagged the same element repeatedly which can only be done serially at two separate time moments

Beliefs about the Minds of Others Influence How We Process Sensory Information

Attending where others gaze is one of the most fundamental mechanisms of social cognition. The present study is the first to examine the impact of the attribution of mind to others on gaze-guided attentional orienting and its ERP correlates. Using a paradigm in which attention was guided to a location by the gaze of a centrally presented face, we manipulated participants' beliefs about the gazer: gaze behavior was believed to result either from operations of a mind or from a machine. In Experiment 1, beliefs were manipulated by cue identity (human or robot), while in Experiment 2, cue identity (robot) remained identical across conditions and beliefs were manipulated solely via instruction, which was irrelevant to the task. ERP results and behavior showed that participants' attention was guided by gaze only when gaze was believed to be controlled by a human. Specifically, the P1 was more enhanced for validly, relative to invalidly, cued targets only when participants believed the gaze behavior was the result of a mind, rather than of a machine. This shows that sensory gain control can be influenced by higher-order (task-irrelevant) beliefs about the observed scene. We propose a new interdisciplinary model of social attention, which integrates ideas from cognitive and social neuroscience, as well as philosophy in order to provide a framework for understanding a crucial aspect of how humans' beliefs about the observed scene influence sensory processing